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ABSTRACT

Geologists and the British Raj, 1870-1910
by
Aja Tolman, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 2016

Major Professor: Dr. Tammy Proctor
Department: History

The Geological Survey of India (GSI) was a government institution that was
created to map the geography and mineral resources of colonial India. British
geologists Thomas Oldham and Valentine Ball used the GSI in order to affect
policy changes regarding museum ownership, environmental conservation, and
railroad construction. All of these policies were intended to impose order on the
landscape and streamline the resource extraction process. Their goal was to enrich
the British Empire. An Indian geologist named Pramatha Nath Bose, who also
worked for the GSI for a time, also worked to enact policy changes regarding
education and production. But instead of trying to make the British Empire
stronger, he wanted to push it out of India. He left the GSI since he found it too
restrictive, and, together with other Indians, restructured geological education at the
university level and set up a successful steel manufacturing mill. Both the British
geologists and Bose helped lay the economic foundation of India’s independence.
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The GSI gave geologists power in some situations, but in others it restricted the
advancement of the field.
(88 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Geologists and the British Raj, 1870-1910
Aja Tolman
The British Raj (1858-1947) hired geologists from both India and Great Britain to
find valuable resources in India, such as coal. The geologists worked to convince the
government to enact policy changes regarding museum ownership, conservation, railway
construction, education, and industrialization. But the geologists had different goals
based on whether they were Indian or European. The Indian geologists wanted India’s
independence from Britain, so their education and industrial policy proposals were geared
towards making India self-sufficient and globally competitive. The British geologists’
goal was to enrich the empire. The British were able to convince the government to
accept most of their proposals. However, the Indian geologists were not. They needed to
leave the government’s employment and recruit local investors before they were able to
change the educational system and begin major industrial companies. They helped lay the
economic foundation for India’s independence.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: ECONOMIC GEOLOGY AND THE BRITISH RAJ

In 1880, Henry B. Medlicott wrote:
The geologist has an anxious part to play with reference to practical questions.
He is instituted more as a concession to what seems but a rising fashion, than
from any faith in his knowledge or any understanding of his functions; and thus
it happens that he is not consulted when his opinion might be for great service,
or, on the other hand, he is called upon to perform what is quite out of his line of
business, or twitted for not having done what it would be unwise to attempt
unless under special circumstances, and impossible to undertake without special
appliances that were not at his disposal. As no one is more aware than himself
that the best, if not the only, warrant for his existence is his usefulness, such
circumstances are very distressing.1
His frustration was understandable. The British Raj had recently replaced the East India
Company (EIC) as the government of colonial India in 1858. Their purpose for
employing scientists was purely for the economic benefit of the British Empire. In the
beginning the Raj did not care about what geologists in India could do to advance the
science. Because of its ability to quickly and efficiently bring wealth to the empire,
geology swiftly became an essential science in India. No other scientists brought the
empire wealth as effectively as geologists, except perhaps botanists. The EIC organized
the Geological Survey of India (GSI) in 1851 for the purpose of reporting the mineral
resources of India. The Raj expected more from its geologists in India than it did of the

1

Valentine Ball, A Manual of the Geology of India, Part III: Economic Geology (London: Trübner and Co.,
1880), v.
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geologists in Britain. In addition to surveying India and mapping its mineral resources,
they were expected to suggest places to build railways and forts, map the land for military
purposes, spy for the British, teach geology at the universities, propose conservation
tactics, and explain the economic viability of proposed industry sites. The scientists felt
constricted by the unrealistic expectations of the government.
Even though the geologists were subject to the instructions of the Raj, they found
ways to use the structure of the survey to change policies, such as museum ownership,
conservation efforts, and transportation construction. Though geologists often died soon
after reaching India, working for the GSI was an attractive work opportunity for British
scientists looking to make a name for themselves. In India, they could make new
discoveries and broaden or challenge the theories of the scientists in Britain. They did not
have the competition that they would have had in Britain. They were valuable because
they were the only link scientists in Britain had to the rest of the empire. Indian
geologists did not enjoy the same power, even if they were educated in Britain and were
just as or more qualified than the other scientists. They were always treated as inferiors to
the British. British geologists did not try to change the entire system of government.
However, Indian geologists that wanted India’s independence found geology a useful tool
as well. The GSI was too restrictive for them to enact meaningful policy changes.
So, the GSI was both an institution that gave geologists power and an institution
that stopped the advancement of the field. When it was too restrictive, the geologists had
to look outside of it for support. Indian investors, educators, and scientists made a
powerful team that was able to change several of the policies that scientists restricted by
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the GSI could not. Once they took charge of their own resources and the government
benefits, they created some of the most successful systems in the world. Their work
provided the economic framework that could support the India’s independence.
Soon after the government started the GSI, the geologists began to organize their
records and publish them, first in the Memoirs of the Geological Survey of India in 1859,
and later in the Records of the Geological Survey of India, started in 1868. This thesis
uses both to determine what policies the geologists proposed. Many of the entries are not
just descriptions of minerals in India, but are also proposals, telling the government how
profitable each find is based on its location, ease of extraction, and proximity to labor,
other minerals, and fuel. Looking at later Records, Memoirs, and maps help determine
whether these proposed policies were implemented. Other sources that include similar
information are society records, reports, and books and essays published individually by
geologists.

Historiography

Imperial Science
In 1967 George Basalla introduced a diffusionist model of modern science. He
defined modern science as the type of science developed during the European
Enlightenment, and explained how it spread throughout empires. The model had three
phases, 1. nonscientific (read: not Western science), 2. colonial science, and 3. the
struggle to achieve independence. In the nonscientific stage, European (or North
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American) scientists surveyed the “unscientific” country and reported their findings back
to Europe.
At this stage, Basalla said, “only nations with a modern scientific culture can
fully appreciate, evaluate, and utilize [phase 1 science].”2 Colonial science, the next
stage, was still heavily dependent on European scientific institutions. Colonial scientists
could be either European or indigenous; all that mattered was that they had been trained
in European institutions. Often, the education systems and societies in the colonized state
were inadequate, and the state lacked a scientific culture. Nevertheless, colonial science
had the resources to “challenge or surpass the work of European savants…but its ultimate
strength lies in the growing number of practicing scientists whose education and work are
supported by an external scientific tradition.”3 In the third stage, scientists in the
colonized states tried to become self-reliant and independent of European institutions.
Often nationalism was a motivation to move from phase 2 to phase 3.4 In his conclusion,
Basalla asked his readers to consider the importance of local social setting, saying that we
cannot understand science as just a successive development of ideas, and that external
factors are essential to understanding science, and especially imperial science.5 Deepak
Kumar criticized this overly simplified model writing that Basalla “assumes uniformity
and homogeneity where none exist” and claiming that he failed to show how science
actually diffuses among the indigenous population.6 However, Basalla did provide a

George Basalla, “The Spread of Western Science,” Science 156, no. 3775 (May 1967): 613.
Ibid., 614.
4
Ibid., 617.
5
Ibid., 620.
6
Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj, 1857-1905 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 2-3.
2
3
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useful preliminary model about colonial science’s dependence on European institutions
and also the struggle for independence from these institutions.
Basalla’s article was intended to cover all areas of science, but Lewis Pyenson
argued that ‘exact’ sciences, such as astronomy, were untainted by imperialism since, for
example, the German government did not perceive them as valuable to colonizing
efforts.7 He thought that these sciences had been the most powerful and enduring of the
sciences, far more than any environmental sciences, since they lacked the imperialist
taint.8 Paolo Palladino and Michael Worboys’ article critiqued Pyenson’s theory. They
contended that this argument was fundamentally flawed, and that the history of Western
science and imperialism, for many people, was the history of science.9 Pyenson referred
almost exclusively to cultural imperialism without considering the necessary exploitation
and domination of the colonized peoples since his narrative was about the role science
played in the ‘civilizing mission.’10 Palladino and Worboys point out that Pyenson failed
to provide any evidence to prove his claim. They concluded that, not only was
imperialism the history of science, but that Pyenson’s categories of ‘exact’ and
‘prescriptive’ science were meaningless since science was not perfectly objective, and
that Pyenson’s ‘exact’ sciences were affected and guided by external influences as well.11
Pyenson stood by his argument about the divisions between exact and prescriptive
science, calling the relativism that Palladino and Worboys used unacceptable for

7

Lewis Pyenson, Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences: German Expansion Overseas 1900-1930 (New
York: Peter Lang, 1985), 1-2.
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Paolo Palladino and Michael Worboys, “Science and Imperialism,” Isis 84, no. 1 (March 1993): 92, 100.
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Ibid., 102.
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Ibid., 96, 98.
11
Ibid., 102.
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historians of science.12 Although Palladino and Worboys are correct that Pyenson does
not successfully argue that ‘exact’ sciences were untainted by imperialism, he did
introduce an important idea in the history of imperial science: the relation between the
perceived value of science and colonialism. The more valuable a colonizing country sees
a science, or how quickly the science will bring wealth, the more likely it is to be funded
and influenced by the government.
M. Anis Alam addressed the idea of the perceived value of science and empire.
He argued that capitalism and science were inseparably joined. The first reason they were
inseparable was that science developed out of the search for and acquisition of wealth. He
rejected the idea that science was constructed independent of the search for wealth and
that it developed unaffected by imperialism. He argued that science was the second most
important social property “to be turned into an adjunct of capital,” with labor being the
first.13 Science, he wrote, proved itself to be one of the most effective means for
acquiring capital. Scientific discoveries made it possible to “divide the entire globe into
captive markets and to capture sources of raw materials for rapidly rising industrial
production.”14 Not only was science tied to capitalism, but the invention of some sciences
and schools of medicine were developed directly in response to imperialism. The second
reason that science and imperialism are inseparable, he argued, was that wealth
maintained the elitism of Western science. He used the example of foreign students from
third world countries. Instead of returning to their own countries and helping ‘improve’

Lewis Pyenson, “Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences Revisited,” Isis 84, no. 1 (March 1993): 107.
M. Anis Alam, “Imperialism and Science,” Social Scientist 6, no. 5 (December 1977): 7.
14
Ibid., 8.
12
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(read: westernize) education, science, and medicine, they became frustrated by the lack of
funding and returned to first world countries, thereby reinforcing the “elitist, hierarchical
and expert science which perpetuates and reproduces the same exploitive system as
before.”15
Sociologists have added to the field of the history of colonial science by fine
tuning the theory of science as merely an instrument of capitalism. Instead they argued,
similarly to Palladino, Worboys, and Alam, that capitalism and science are inseparable.
For example, Evan Schofer rejected the idea that the empire and its interests were the
only driving influences behind scientific institutionalization and argued that the theory of
science limited historians from considering other possibilities. He posited that there were
also cultural, political, and religious reasons that explain how science was
institutionalized across the world. He used Protestantism, scientific associations, and
statistics to analyze the spread of science.16 Scientific associations were, he argued, an
effective way to diffuse knowledge across the world. Innovation and new knowledge
travelled quickly among societies.17 He wrote that, “industrial capitalism may not create a
functional ‘need’ for science, but rather may provide the resources and social relations
required for the institutionalization of science.”18 According to Schofer, the idea that
science was restricted to wealthy and industrialized nations was seriously flawed because
third world countries, such as India, possess advanced scientific infrastructures.19 He
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concluded by saying that science, and specifically geology, was institutionalized around
the world through a European-centric society of elite science. They were the most
successful in Protestant nations. Countries chose to incorporate science because of
culture, not just because of instrumentalism.20
Although Pyenson and Alam recognize the importance of the monetary and
political value an empire places on sciences like botany and geology, their narrow focus
causes them to miss the important moral motivations driving and justifying imperialism.
Sociologists address these issues in their works. Read together, they provide a more
holistic view of the motivations behind colonial science. Basalla’s model, though
seriously flawed as Kumar points out, provides a useful framework in which to think
about colonial science and scientists.

Imperial Science and the Natural World
Environmental historians have contributed greatly to the history of science and
the natural world. Several historians have focused on the institutions behind the natural
sciences, and the British Empire and the East India Trading Company (EIC) are popular
topics. Environmental historians have addressed the importance of the role of
environment, refining Basalla’s narrow diffusionist model. Instead of showing just the
effects of science on the environment, they also show how the environment shaped
science. They also show how the EIC’s broad contact with the Indian Ocean and Asia led
to a change in their thinking and policies that resembled modern environmentalism.21

20
21

Ibid., 752.
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The East India Company and the Natural World addresses how scientific
information was disseminated throughout the Empire. This is where the importance of
place comes in. Basalla’s model mostly focused on how scientists took knowledge
directly from Europe and implemented it in almost the exact same way in the colonies.
However, recent work by James Beattie recognized how place shaped scientific ideas in
something he called “imperial careering.” “Rather than viewing such groups [scientists]
as having introduced ideas directly from Europe to the colonies…we can see their
experiences, their policies and their attitudes having been accumulated through
movement from one place to another.”22 And it was not the only reason that science in
the colonies looked different. Extensive polycentric networks of correspondence, more
complicated than the ones in Britain, also helped shape the nature of colonial science.23
Imperialism and the natural world talks about the applied sciences in imperialism
as well as the importance of symbolism. Geological surveying was important to the EIC
and British Raj for several reasons, including mining, smelting, construction of railroads
and steamboat systems, and land evaluation for building material and the feasibility of
colonization.24 They were most interested in results submitted by the geologists rather
than how well they conducted their surveys or in the benefit to scientific knowledge.25
The attitudes of both technical scientists and gentleman scientists were changing too. In

World (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 4, 270.
22
Alan Lester, “Introduction: New Imperial and Environmental Histories of the Indian Ocean,” in
Damodaran, Winterbottom, and Lester, 5.
23
Rohan D’Souza, “Mischievous Rivers and Evil Shoals: The English East India Company and the
Colonial Resource Regime,” in Damodaran, Winterbottom, and Lester, 130.
24
Robert A. Stafford, “Annexing the landscapes of the past: British imperial geology in the nineteenth
century,” in Imperialism and the natural world ed. John A. MacKenzie (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1990): 73.
25
John M. MacKenzie, introduction to Imperialism and the Natural World ed. John A. MacKenzie, 9.

10
France in 1873, J. L. Havard, the vice-president of the Central Committee of the
Chambres syndicales de Paris, “announced [to the members of the Chambres syndicales]
that he had found, ‘next to the old current of opinion too exclusively scientific, a current
of new ideas from young men who rightly judge that science today can no longer neglect
its industrial and commercial applicability’.”26 Most agreed and decided to help trade.27
The symbolism of surveying and cartography was important to the Europeans as well.
Maps “symbolized regularity and improvement: they graphically chartered the European
conquest of the peripheral wilderness.”28 Early British geologists, both in Britain and in
India, felt not only justified but morally obligated to explore and chart unexplored
territory, bringing order to a ‘primitive’ land.29 Writing specifically about geologists and
imperialism in the nineteenth century, James Secord analyzed Roderick Murchison.
Murchison served as the president of the Royal Geological Society off and on between
1843 and 1871 and was the director of British Geological Survey, the Royal School of
Mines, and the Museum of Practical Geology. He was a dynamic character eagerly
invested in spreading the superiority of British science aggressively throughout the world,
which made him an especially popular person to study. Most histories of colonial geology
focus on him. According to Secord, Murchison used metaphors of militarism and
imperialism in his writing to understand the role that science played in imperial rhetoric.
Murchison’s disappointing career in the army, his naming system, and disagreements

William H. Schneider, “Geographical reform and municipal imperialism in France, 1870-80,” in
MacKenzie, 101.
27
Ibid., 105.
28
Stafford, “Annexing the landscapes,” 73-4.
29
Richard H. Grove, “Colonial conservation, ecological hegemony and popular resistance: towards a global
synthesis,” in MacKenzie, 18.
26
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with other scientists both in Britain and around the world changed the way he looked at
the landscape and framed his arguments.30
His unique perspective, as a former military officer, allowed Murchison to
discover a previously unnoticed layer in the earth. He hoped that his fame in geology
would make up for his lack of fame in the army. Murchison named his newly discovered
layer the Silurian layer, after a warlike group of Ancient Britons that resisted the Roman
Empire and supposedly had lived where he discovered the layer.31 He was desperate to
keep this name even when historians disagreed about where the Silurians lived.
Murchison rewrote history to extend the land of Siluria to keep the designation
“Silurian.”32 For Murchison, Secord says, “the Silurian classification, along with the rest
of his stratigraphical work, simultaneously brought honor to himself and to Britain.”33
Murchison adamantly supported his naming system, especially against other parts of the
world. He wanted to express the superiority of England by making the English names in
science standard throughout the world.34 He was appalled when U. S. geologists began
naming geological layers after Native American words:
This was one of the possibilities that Murchison had feared, for the importation of
stratigraphical names from abroad frequently aroused intense opposition,
especially in the United States. Geologists on the opposite side of the Atlantic
preferred to name indigenous rocks with Indian tribal names rather than Welsh
ones, and to use American localities as types in preference to those imported from
England.35

James A. Secord, “King of Siluria: Roderick Murchison and the Imperial Theme in Nineteenth-Century
British Geology,” Victorian Studies 25, no. 4 (Summer 1982): 421.
31
Ibid., 422.
32
Ibid., 423.
33
Ibid., 426.
34
Ibid., 437.
35
Ibid., 438.
30
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Murchison’s opponents were afraid that his personal and national pride had clouded his
judgment and was preventing true science and scientific theory. However, as Secord
showed, “method and territory were both clearly legitimate weapons in scientific
controversy.”36 Murchison became a national hero not only because he discovered
important geological features, but also because he was able, through science, to show the
world the supremacy of Great Britain.37
Writing more about Murchison’s role in imperial science, in 1990 Robert A.
Stafford discussed how the British used science to justify racism and environmental
determinism. He explained that the main scientific societies “shared an ideology which
envisioned science as an instrument of economic policy.”38 They hired several scientists
to make maps, which symbolized regularity and improvement, and then charted their
conquest of perceived wilderness.39 Stafford attributed the imperialistic rhetoric of
geology to Murchison and stated that “geology in this era was as much a territorial as a
historical science.”40 According to Stafford, “Murchison’s research alone went far toward
establishing the paramountcy of British geology, and he considered the mapping of the
earth’s surface according to Britain’s system of stratigraphic nomenclature as a scientific
corollary to the nation’s imperial and commercial expansion.”41 His idea of empire was
feudal in nature. He wanted to acquire territories to both define the greatness of the
British Empire and benefit Great Britain.42 Britain used the earth sciences to justify the

36
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takeover. Since the tropical climates of Africa, India, and Australia reminded the British
of the ancient earth, they concluded that everything in those areas must be prehistoric.
Stafford wrote, “The study of ancient environment fostered an impression of the
colonies as a primitive place inferior to Europe. Such research contributed to theories of
race and environmental determinism which shaped the ideology and practice of
imperialism.”43

Early Imperial Geology in India
Despite encouragement from Britain, in India it took a long time for the British
geologists to explore and exploit the subcontinent. Andrew Grout examined geology in
India under the East India Company. He explained that the EIC was not eager to exploit
India’s mineral resources, and often resisted the British government’s attempts to get
them to start using India’s wealth.44 He described several reasons for their reluctance.
The first was ideological. The British argued that mining had degrading effects on
the land, the British Empire, and humanity. Instead, “agriculture was reinforced by
arguments influenced by the Protestant work ethic, an ethic which stressed the morality
of wealth gained as a result of human toil, as in agriculture, rather than wealth simply
found, as gold or diamonds were.”45 But Grout argued that this rhetoric was merely a
cover up for a more serious problem that the EIC believed mining would cause:

43
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colonization.46 They did not want to people to come seeking wealth in India and settle
down there. And mining would also make the colony more independent from Great
Britain, and that was judged “highly impolitic and also contrary to the maxims of our
Government.”47 The second reason was that geology in India lacked structure, skill, and
organization.48 Often, geologists would arrive only to be disappointed because of the lack
of funding, unclear instructions, the multiplicity of projects, and a lack of organization in
the societies, museums, and personnel. Once the geologists began to figure things out,
they would usually get sick and die, and the government and company would again have
to search for someone with adequate skills who was willing to come to India. The third
reason is that scientists in the nineteenth century were heavily dependent on a patronage
system. Without people willing to fund geology, there was little geologists could do.
They could not get the necessary money to make any substantial progress since most of
the money and patronage went to botany and agriculture.49 Even if a geologist was able to
secure funding and travel to India for an appointment, there was no guarantee that they
would continue to receive support from back home. Even de la Beche essentially
abandoned one of his geologists once he got to India.50 Grout ends his analysis by stating
that ultimately, the EIC had to change its form of state before it would consider taking
responsibility for geological surveys. “The operation of the kind of pan-Indian geological
survey envisaged by many could only operate successfully within a new state structure-a

46
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pan-Indian bureaucratic state.”51 However, the establishment of the official Geological
Survey of India (GSI) was not necessarily a signal of geology’s triumph in India.

Later Imperial Geology in India
Kumar is one of the few historians who specifically addressed colonial science
under the administration of the British Raj in his book Science and the Raj, 1857-1905.
Although his book covers most of the scientific activity in India, some parts of his book
focus on the objectives and struggles of the GSI. He argued that geology and geography
were important to the Raj and EIC both economically and militarily. The EIC found that
a knowledge of the layout of India was just as important to the military as having superior
firearms.
Kumar argued that “The East India Company (EIC) was quick to realize that the
whole physical basis of its governance depended on a geographical, geological and
botanical knowledge of the area it conquered.”52 Though the EIC appreciated the
importance of the geological surveys, they were reluctant to spend more than absolutely
necessary on the surveys. They were interested in minimizing costs but expected
maximum benefits from the work of geologists.53 Generally, geologists were unhappy
with how the government handled geology. Perpetually underfunded and short on staff,
geologists often were unable to meet the EIC’s demands effectively.54 They also
disagreed with the single purpose of economic geology. Both the geologists in India and

51
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in Great Britain pushed for more freedom to discover things that were not immediately
economically useful, but enriched the general knowledge of the natural sciences.55 This
created a rift between state geologists and the government, but geologists had very little
power to push for change since the power structure was so top-heavy. The Secretary of
State was quick to refuse requests for funding ‘ornamental’ geological expeditions and
slow to grant funding for ‘economic’ geological expeditions.56 Both parties had the
common interest of enriching the empire; the EIC and Raj wanted to enrich it through
mineral wealth and military knowledge, while the geologists wanted to enrich it through
scientific knowledge that could not have been acquired in Europe.
The few scholars that have discussed geologists working for the Raj focus on the
top heavy model of science. This model predicts that when a government is as controlling
as the British Raj was, scientists have very little influence on the government or its
policies. They and their science were subject to the government’s heavy handed
management. The Victorian imperial government was controlling, but not so much that
the scientists had no agency. In fact, they were some of the major driving forces behind
policy changes and government decisions. They actively campaigned when they believed
it would bring them more power. This thesis hopes to answer the question of how much
power they had to change policies, and what their motivations to do so were.

55
56

Ibid., 108.
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Outline

The second chapter looks mainly at the works of Thomas Oldham and Valentine
Ball. Oldham was the third director of the British Geological Survey, which the first
director, David Hiram Williams, renamed the Geological Survey of India. Williams died
within a few months of arriving in India. John McClelland, a medical doctor, took over
the survey until another man could be found. He had been part of the Coal Committee,
and had been the first to suggest hiring professional geologists to find coal in India. Until
the GSI, army surgeons were the men that typically reported on the mineral finds.
Geology had not yet professionalized in India, so the gentleman amateur naturalist
tradition was the EIC’s main source of mineral information. They liked McClelland’s
idea of hiring trained geologists to do the surveys since the army surgeons were rarely
able to draw up a thorough and accurate report. Often the reports were overly
exaggerated as well. They also did not have an accurate map of India. They realized that
they could not extract material efficiently or profitably until they could get a systematic,
professional survey done of India and a professional map drawn up. So the EIC
established the GSI in 1851, for the sole purpose of mapping and reporting on the
economically profitable mineral wealth.57
After the EIC found Oldham, they allowed McClelland to retire from his
supervisory role. Oldham was one of the most qualified officers they could have found.
He was an Irish geologist who worked for the ordnance survey of Ireland. In addition to

See Grout, “Geology and India,” 210-11; Stafford, “Annexing the landscapes,” 71; and Kumar, Science
and the Raj, 33-34.
57
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surveying, he was a professor of geology and assistant professor of engineering, a curator
and assistant secretary to the Geological Society in Dublin, and an assistant secretary to
the Institute of Civil Engineers of Ireland, among other notable appointments. In 1851 the
EIC offered him a job as Director of the survey, which he accepted.58 He was one of the
most influential and well-known geologists in both India and Britain.
Ball was a less well-known geologist who also worked for the GSI. He was
popular with the English, however, because of his book that he published in 1880 entitled
Jungle Life in India: Or, The Journeys and Journals of an Indian Geologist.59 In this
book he talked about what he encountered while in India. He was also from Ireland (most
of the early notable geologists were) and spent most of his time in the central provinces
of India. This was unusual, as most of the geologists were assigned to parts of India
closer to the coasts. He assembled the Manual of Geology in 1880 as well, which was an
important collection of all of the work done by geologists up to that time.
Chapter two analyzes what influence these two geologists had on government
policies on museums, conservation, railway construction, and industrialization until 1900.
For the most part they were very successful. The one area where they failed to make a
difference was in industrialization. Neither were able to convince the Raj that creating
large scale iron and steel mills would be economically beneficial.
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Chapter three primarily analyses the work of the Indian geologist Pramatha Nath
Bose, who was instrumental in changing the education system and policies regarding
native industrialization, something the British geologists had not really considered. Bose
was a Hindu who traveled to England to get his education. The British government sent
him back to India to be a graded officer in the GSI. He was the first one. While there, he
worked on the Siwalik fossil deposit, which was incredibly rich with prehistoric fossils
and an important find in the intellectual history of paleontology. He also discovered
several important mineral deposits, though the government overlooked most of them.
After he resigned from the survey and joined the swadeshi movement, he attempted to set
up some small scale industries, including a soap factory, which failed. He worked with
the Tata family to establish the first large scale steel mill in India, which became and
currently is one of the most prosperous companies in India.60
Each of these geologists’ influence may have been anomalous, but their attitudes
and beliefs were representative of major trends in India. The British geologists’ goal was
to enrich the empire. The only interest they had in developing India was in so far as it
helped Britain without competing with it. Bose was primarily interested in developing
scientific and technological equality with the British. He wanted to use this not to enrich
the empire, but to push it out of India. The chapters are divided by not only themes of
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policy changes, but also by the goals of the geologists involved. Each goal required a
different approach.
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CHAPTER II
BRITISH GEOLOGISTS: MUSEUMS, CONSERVATION, TRANSPORTATION,
AND INDUSTRY
Each policy that Oldham and Ball proposed was designed to make resource
extraction more efficient. They believed the best way to make it efficient was to impose
order: on the landscape, on the minerals, on teaching, on records, on the transportation
systems, and on industry.
The few policy changes Oldham affected with regard to geology were focused on
organizing and educating. The GSI needed something like a center of operations and a
way to categorize and save all of the information it gathered. Unless the reports were
organized and published, they were unusable. Geologists, or at least geologists’
assistants, needed to be trained in the science, but Oldham did not trust the university to
do it. They also needed a place to analyze their material. Paleontologists could estimate
the value of coal, but only a chemist could analyze the exact content. Conservation and a
type of proto-environmentalism were also indirectly important. Part of the job of a
geologist was to analyze soil. Most of the goods Britain was trying to extract were
agricultural. Geologists would advise where things could be planted and flourish. They
also wanted to promote the planting of ‘useful’ plants, such as trees, which would help
fuel their proposed factories.
Ball’s proposals were much more closely tied to geology. He was most concerned
with the connection between transportation systems and resources. They were dependent
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on each other, and his proposed railway route would take advantage of that dependency.
His end goal was to start the industrialization of India. Unfortunately, he was using the
wrong tactics to convince the government. It was only later that Indian scientists and
manufacturers would be able to convince the government to change its policies regarding
private mining.

Museums

By 1841, the Asiatic Society of Bengal, one of the most important scientific
societies in India, recognized the need for a geology museum. They had a growing
collection of geological specimens but nowhere to put them. During the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, museums represented control over an area. According to John
Mackenzie, museums gathered all of the unknown and mystical and organized and
mapped it, getting rid of its elusive qualities and allowing it to be made useful.61 They
represented tools of empire and also provided visual justifications for colonial expansion.
Mackenzie wrote, “The museum itself was a machine for measuring the alleged
achievements, or lack of them, of mankind. It was also a key ‘imperial archive’, both
three-dimensional and conventional, through specimens, objects and records.”62
However, museums served more purposes than just mental conquest. They were
connecting points between scientists and the public, collections and theories, and
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professional and public science.63 Museums were used to exchange information.
Specimens were circulated among museums across the world so that scientists could
examine them and come up with theories. Britain guarded its monopoly on museums
carefully. They worried that their London museums might be outdone by a museum in
India, so they requested that only duplicate materials be kept in India, and the best
specimens sent to England.64 Museums, together with journals, proved to be one of the
most important sources and centers of scientific information in the nineteenth century
British colonies.65
Geological museums were important to geologists, and Oldham was especially
interested in museums. One of the first things he did when he arrived in India was
establish a museum and laboratory, just as de la Beche had done in England.66 Typically,
the societies and scientists advocated for the same thing from the government: more
funding to study science. This meant that they were usually allies. But in a somewhat
unusual situation, when it came to museum ownership geologists were opposed to the
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society. Both the geologists and the society appealed to keep the ownership of the
museum, but by 1856 Oldham had convinced the government to give it to the GSI.
Oldham did more than support the idea to give the museum to the GSI, as he was the one
who “pulled some strings to influence the decision.”67 Most of the Asiatic Society
opposed the transfer of ownership since the museum gave them prestige and power. They
also felt that by giving that part of the museum to ‘economic’ geologists, the government
was severing the ties between theoretical science and the museum.
Oldham wanted the museum for several reasons. Written descriptions could tell a
geologist only so much about a mineral. Scientists began to realize the importance of
careful map-making, a highly desired skill which made a scientist indispensable during
the nineteenth century. Not only did maps and illustrations give visuals about minerals,
but they also provided information about where the mineral came from. This was an
important element in scientific education. Geologists needed to know where they were
likely to find coal. Previous reports were not always accurate, as they were often based
on hearsay, so knowing when and where to look was an essential skill.68 But illustrations
still were not enough. Potential geologists needed to see and handle minerals to become
well enough acquainted with them to be able to find them while surveying. British ore
looked different than foreign ore, so it was important that students see and handle the
type of ore or mineral that they would need to find.69 Museums became an important part
of educating future geologists and mining engineers. Training new scientists improved
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the efficiency of mineral exploitation.70 Hands-on experience, Oldham believed, was as
important as courses in geology and mining. Later, he refused to support the University
of Calcutta based on its lack of resources.71
Besides being an essential teaching tool, museums were also indispensable
repositories. Minerals were kept by the museum, but were poorly preserved. Under the
Asiatic Society, the mineral specimens were uncategorized, not arranged in any order,
and decaying.72 Oldham quickly turned things around and carefully catalogued each
specimen. Mining and geological survey records were also given to the museum for safekeeping. There was no system of record keeping set up by the GSI, so a library of their
reports prevented needless duplication. GSI geologists spent a lot of their time early on
correcting maps and surveys done incorrectly.73 Sometimes they did not have a map that
had been done, but had to go and correct it anyway.74 Geologists also put their reports
with the museum to prevent exaggeration (also a very common problem with pre-GSI
surveys) of mineral resources, and to protect their rights as the discoverer from anyone
else who “might fancy themselves to be the first discoverers” and take the claim of
discovery away from the deserving geologist.75 Without museums’ report repositories,
many valuable reports would have been lost, and geologists would have wasted time and
funding on re- surveying land.
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The Museum of Economic Geology served one last major role in geological
knowledge: it employed a chemist. By this time, scientists had begun to realize the
important contributions chemistry made to the earth sciences. Until about the nineteenth
century, minerals had been grouped together by looks and inherent nature rather than by
chemical makeup.76 Chemistry was an essential element to economic geology. It was
important to have a chemist in India because it removed the need to send specimens to
Britain for analysis. The British Raj needed to know not only what kind of material they
were dealing with, but also how useful it was. For example, chemists needed to analyze
the quality of coal found throughout India. The calorific value (or the measure of the
potential energy of the coal to provide heat) varies based on composition and age.
Generally, Indian coal had a lower calorific value than British coal, which meant that
they had to burn more to get the same amount of energy. The Raj was looking for coal
that was good enough to run steamships along the canals, but especially along the
Ganges. It was also used to power the trains on the extensive railway network in India.
Chemistry also helped determine what type of technology one needed to work the coal.
Coal produces ash, but depending on its makeup it produces either bottom ash, which
collects at the bottom of a furnace, or fly ash, which does not settle. Each type of coal
requires a different type of furnace. If the wrong coal is put into a furnace, the furnace
will be damaged.77 So, it was necessary to have a chemist not only to determine the
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quality of the coal, but also what type of byproducts it produced so that it was used with
the correct technology.
Geologists would often collect different specimens of the same deposit. One was
for display, and the other (often uglier) was used in teaching and chemical analysis.78 The
chemist also analyzed soil quality. The museum also was important for agricultural
decisions as well. Quality and availability of coal and other precious minerals were major
factors in securing funding and permission from the government to mine.
Oldham and later superintendents of the GSI guarded their ownership of the
Museum of Economic Geology. The Museum was an essential and often underrated part
of the success of the survey. It provided the physical center of the GSI where they could
educate the public about their efforts, display their success to the government and
investors, and teach students about their future careers. They relied on the collections of
information at the Museum to avoid wasting time, effort, and money. Beyond saving
time, the GSI also relied on the Museum to analyze and catalogue their finds. The
Museum helped ensure their success as geologists and empire builders. It was also
essential to make sure that their projects would continue to be funded, both by investors
in Europe and by the government.
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Conservation

Both The East India Company and the Natural World and Imperialism and the
natural world address the emergence of ideas about conservation and protoenvironmentalism. Richard Grove contended that environmentalism “rather than being
exclusively a product of European or North American predicaments and philosophies,
emerged as a direct response to the destructive social and ecological conditions of
colonial rule.”79 Conservation was not motivated by any concern to save the earth. There
was nothing altruistic about the EIC’s and later the British Raj’s environmentalism. The
goal was to find a way to boost the productivity and sustainability of resources. Vinita
Damodaran argued that “the linked themes of exploitation and conservation thus lie at the
heart of the environmental history of empire.”80 However, several authors have only
addressed how the botanical sciences contributed to conservationism.81 But the belief that
Western control could improve conservation extended to geology as well.
Valentine Ball’s analysis of iron-making near the Rajmehal hills provides a good
example. In 1876, he surveyed the area and discovered that several Indians known locally
as Kols were producing iron using pre-colonial Indian methods. Their methods were
inefficient, so the output of iron was, as he termed it, inconsiderable.82 Closer to some
villages, a person known as “Mr. Mackey” had established an iron mill about twenty
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years before. Most of the Indians began to work for him at his mill, and at one point they
were even compelled to stop using any of their own furnaces. But the company struggled
and eventually closed its doors. Because of Mackey’s mill, “the most complete
indigenous system of iron manufacture ever practiced in Bengal was for the time put a
stop to.”83 Though Ball thought Mackey’s approach to making iron could have been
improved, he welcomed the result that the mill had broken up the Indian manufacturers.
The inefficiency of their furnaces had left the landscape near unusable. There was no
efficient drainage system, which meant that much of the material was unreachable and
their small scale excavating left the resources severely underutilized. Ball reiterated what
Hughes (another geologist that did a cursory survey of the area a few years earlier) said in
1870. “I would draw attention to the necessity of introducing a rational system of mining
when large quantities of ore will have to be raised. An immense waste of labour occurs in
mining the ore by ball pits as at present.”84 In addition to the suggestion of a more
systematic extraction policy, Ball also advocated, in order for successful mining and iron
production to occur there in the future, carefully cultivating trees. In the end, he admitted
that a successful iron mill there was impossible, partially because the soil, even with
scientific treatment, was too poor to grow the necessary timber.85
Ball’s conservation plan of the Rajmehal hills was a classic example of what the
British thought conservation should look like: ordered according to Western models.
Conservation provided justification for any of the Raj’s policies that displaced Indian
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workers. They believed that Indians were incapable of coming up with the best
exploitation/conservation models and policies on their own. By replacing the Indians’
production with their own, they were able to much more efficiently extract resources and
maintain the area’s productivity. Geologists’ reports and suggestions provided all the
justification that was needed to stop Indian industry. Ball’s report also shows what
geologists were expected to do for a survey.
Geologists were not supposed to merely recount what amount of minerals they
found in different places. Their reports were essentially preliminary business or building
plans. They would evaluate the resources and provide an estimate of the cost to extract
them. When they arrived at an area, they were looking for much more than minerals. The
location of the minerals was just as important as the minerals themselves, if not more so.
Part of the reason for the survey was to know where everything was in relation to
everything else, including transportation systems, metropolitan areas, other minerals, and
water sources. Building a steel mill, for example, had to meet several location
requirements in order to be worthwhile. A steel mill was,
…a complex of at least five industrial plants related vertically to each other. It
also contains a number of ancillary facilities that are not directly involved in the
production of steel but are essential to the mill’s operations. A typical steel mill
consumes four basic raw materials: coal, iron ore, fluxes, and scrap. It also
consumes a number of other essential inputs such as refractories, water, and …
power. At least part of the mill’s coal may be washed to improve its chemical and
physical properties. Washing usually takes place at or near mines. Washed coal is
then shipped to the mill where it may be blended with unwashed coal to obtain a
mixture most suitable for the mill’s coke ovens, the first major unit of a steel
mill.86
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The next parts of a mill were the blast furnace, melt shop, intermediate rolling mill, and
the final rolling mill. Each of these required material to fuel them. For a mill to be
successful, it needed to be in close proximity to a good source of these materials. It also
needed to be close to a transportation system like a railroad or river so that they could
ship the raw material in and the finished product out. It was rare to find a place that met
all of the requirements.
Conservation added a new dimension to finding a place that was suitable. It was
more than justification or imposing order on a disorderly industry. The
“environmentalism” practiced by the geologists was to streamline resource extraction.
This meant stopping Indians from what they were doing and allowing the land to rest and
be replanted or drained. Only then would a company start mining. They would often hire
the Indians they displaced. It was about building an ideal situation where an industry
could flourish. That is why the geologists could cross over into suggesting policies for
conservation and botany, just as Ball did.

Transportation – Railways and Steamboats

The primary purpose of establishing the GSI was to look for coal. The Raj had little
interest in other minerals, though they required that geologists report other finds as well.
The government determined that their “chief object [was] determining the existence,
extent and relative accessibility of the beds of mineral coal in different parts in India and
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their immediate applicability to the increasing demands of the steam-navigation of the
Ganges and its tributaries.”87 For many years this took up all of their time.
Sometimes this meant that they were either verifying or correcting other scientists’
works; other times this meant finding and evaluating uncharted territory. Most reports
about the existence and richness of minerals were exaggerated. The military surgeons
who had done most of the surveying were underqualified and did not have the time to
survey the land properly, even if they had known what they were doing. Oldham entered
the GSI knowing that he would spend most of his time looking for coal, and the majority
of his twenty-five years with the survey was spent charting coalfields. Coal became even
more important after the introduction of the railway system in India. Oldham understood
the importance of discovering minerals in developing countries, but he was frustrated by
the lack of ‘pure’ science. But “the only idea the Government then had of the duties of a
geological surveyor was that he should go about from place to place, and report upon real
or fancied discoveries of minerals. The government would always keep on goading the
various organizations to work along only economically beneficial lines.”88 The GSI was
finally able to produce a full geological map of India in 1877, right after Oldham
retired.89
The completion of the map was important for the development of geology as a
science in India. It not only visually represented the end of the first stage of the GSI, it
allowed geologists to move on to other discoveries. The Raj was only marginally
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interested in anything other than coal until the railway network across India was being
finished and they knew where all the major coal deposits were. Until 1894, the majority
of the geologists worked as economic scientists.90 After that, half of the geologists in the
GSI working exclusively as economic scientists, and most of the others worked in the
scientific section, pursuing “purely scientific enquiry.”91
These maps were essential when the government evaluated where to build
railways. There were several factors in deciding where to build, including the needs of
the military, the need for better communication, the difficulty of building in specific
areas, and overall improvement to the transportation system. But one of the most
important factors was the location of coal deposits. The British wanted to build railways
along coalfields so that they did not have to transport fuel to trains. Following coalfields
significantly lowered the costs of operation. The location of railroads was dependent on
the location of coal.
Valentine Ball was one of the most influential geologists when it came to building
railroads. In 1880 he assembled a much needed book that consolidated all of the
information that geologists had so far collected. It filled a big gap in reference
information about Indian mineral wealth. In A Manual of the Geology of India Part III:
Economic Geology, Ball describes the location and describes the economic viability of
almost ninety minerals ranging from coal to jade to clay. Underlying the entire book,
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however, was Ball’s argument that there needed to be a railway that cut through the
central provinces of India and connected Bombay to Calcutta. The 1880 railways system
had a train that connected these two cities, but it took a much less direct route, heading
north from Bombay to Allahabad and then dropping down into Calcutta (see map 1). He
showed that railroads’ dependence on coal was not just one way; coal also relied heavily
on railroads.
Coal derived its value from four main characteristics: its accessibility, quality,
quantity, and location. The British preferred to mine coal that was located close to the
surface, since this was the easiest to mine. Sometimes coal was found in a vertical cliff,
which was more difficult to extract. The British wanted the minimize the amount they
spent mining the coal, so a coalfield that was wide rather than deep or tall was more
valuable even if it contained the same amount of coal.
The quality of the coal was also an issue. Because Indian coal was poor quality,
the government’s hope of fueling steamships with it during the Opium Wars was not
fulfilled. The ships would have required so much Indian coal that they could have carried
little else. Therefore, the only economically viable option was to ship quality English coal
to India and the surrounding areas. But most Indian coal was sufficient to fuel steamboats
on the Indian rivers and Indian trains. Quality of the coal became an important issue
when the government considered building metalworking industries. Metallurgy
equipment requires better quality coal so that it is not damaged. In geologists’ reports of
coal deposits, they almost always included an estimate of quality of coal. This is an
example of how the geologists ranked the coal:
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1.

Inferior coal … 12 feet not worked.

2.

Good cooking coal … 18-20 feet on fire.

3.

Good [cooking coal] … 3 feet 4 inches, worked together.

4.

Ten feet good [cooking coal] … 12 feet, worked together.92

Categorized by quality, the geologist reported what the economic advantages of
his coal discovery was. The inferior coal in this example could have been used to power
transportation, or it could be used by local Indians for their various needs. The cooking
coal (or coking coal) would be more likely to be used by transportation, but it could also
be used by an iron or steel manufacturing mill.
Quantity of coal was another factor that the British considered. Some areas in
India contained as much as 1.5 billion tons of easily accessible and relatively good
quality coal.93 It was less profitable to mine small deposits since they would be exhausted
quicker, and the company would have to relocate equipment and people to another
deposit. Frequent relocation would have cut into the costs of production as well.
But these three characteristics of coalfields were insignificant when determining
where to mine coal. The most important characteristic was the coal’s location. For
example, the large 1.5 billion-ton coalfield was not mined, but another smaller field was
because of location.94 The coal’s location mattered in two different ways: where it was
located in relation to a railway or another mode of transportation, and where it was
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located in relation to other minerals. Being close to a railway was the single most
important determining factor of whether a coalfield would be mined or not. A deposit
only became economically important if there was a railway near it to transport it.95 If
there was not an easy way to transport the coal to major centers of export or industry,
then the coal was essentially useless. In India there were at least thirty notable coalfields,
but because of their proximity to the railway and centers of manufactures, only four to
five were worked.96
So, when a geologist surveyed a coal field, he recorded how near it was to a
railway (or canal or river), major city or port, and labor. Water transport was sometimes
cheaper than railway transport.97 It needed to be close to a city because shipping costs
could raise the price of the coal too much to be competitive. Ball gives a formula for the
price of coal. In addition to the mining cost, the shipping would add “1/5th pie per maund
per mile, or Rs. 2-5 tons per 100 miles.”98 Labor was the last important need. If there
were no Indians living nearby to work the fields, then the government would have to
import workers, and provide places to live. Indian workers were not paid nearly as much
as imported workers and were not provided with places to live.99 The British tried to
reserve imported miners for much more valuable material. They did not want to have
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them work coalfields if unskilled Indians could do it just as well or better. These three
factors determined a mineral’s value. Coal was just one example; it also applied to
precious metals like gold.100 Smaller, poorer quality, and less easily mined coalfields
were often chosen over rich coalfields because of these other factors.101
The railways were so important to coal that mining leases were dependent on the
railroad. The Narbada Coal and Iron Company obtained a lease from the government to
mine coal and to make iron. The iron was of exceptional quality, and required less flux
because the ore was “slightly calcareous.”102 Even though the company had never
manufactured iron before, they were in close proximity to all of the necessary material.
Indians carried the material to the mill in baskets, but since the distance was less than ten
miles, the ‘shipping’ costs were not too high. The government gave them the lease on one
condition. They needed to manufacture at least 5,000 tons of marketable iron “within five
years of the opening of the railway to Jabalpur.”103 If they could not send the iron to
major markets, then the project did not interest the government. The company’s survival
depended on their ability to get iron to the markets, and the government knew this.
Railways dictated the amount of mining that could happen, and because the good’s value
was based on its ability to be transported, their lease agreement was dependent on the
completion of a railway.
It is unsurprising that Ball’s suggested train route was through the central
provinces. It would come close to several important mineral deposits. The route would be
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faster than the preexisting line, but the destination was only part of the importance of the
rail.104 The route was just as important as the destination. By putting a transportation
route next to mineral deposits, they would become valuable. All of the discoveries that
Ball made in the central provinces would be economically meaningful. Ball, along with
other geologists, also hoped that the railway would lead to the discovery of more valuable
minerals. Railways would not only make the land around it valuable, but the process of
making it, they hoped, would reveal more minerals (as making canals did).105 The
government accepted Ball’s proposal for the railway route by the time of his death in
1895.106 They sent many other surveyors to scout out other possible routes, but his proved
to be the most economically viable. By 1909, the railway was complete (see map 2).

Industrialization

The government used the railways and resource maps to determine manufacturing
policies and projects. In contrast to their success with resource extraction and railway
construction, geologists were unsuccessful in their attempts to use the resources for
industrialization. Most, if not all, of the geologists recognized the need for the Raj to
establish its own metal making industry. But they all had different opinions about how
this needed to happen. Sometimes they would advocate for small scale production, but
oppose any large scale systemized production. Whatever their opinion, they tried to keep
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the money within the Empire. They did not consider a mill owned and run by Indians.
Any suggestions they had revolved around supporting the current import economy. At
least 70 percent of iron was imported from Britain.107 The Raj did not develop their iron
or steel industries quickly or effectively. Headrick explains that,
The connection between the needs of an industry and the growth of another is
known as backward linkage. The success of a backward linkage in stimulating a
supplier-industry in the same country as the customer-industry will depend on
several factors: the existence of native entrepreneurs, their access to capital and
technology, their costs compared with those of foreign competitors, and the
policies of the government. When a sufficient demand exists but does not give
rise to a domestic industry, there is a leakage of the backward-linkage effect to
foreign suppliers, and a loss of what could have been a stimulus to economic
development. All countries beginning to industrialize have been conscious of this
effect and have hastened to protect their infant industries with tariffs, subsidies, or
state enterprises. That India did not was just as much a political choice.108
India, though well equipped with natural resources to make iron and steel, did not do so
because they were the British metallurgy industries’ biggest customers. Mills in India
would have been in competition with British mills, and so would not necessarily add to
England’s wealth. They had occasionally subsidized a few small scale iron making
industries, but there was no system of industry and nothing large enough to challenge
their dependence on Britain. Other than those few attempts, the British directed their
policies against native industry. The Government of India Act required that stores (or
manufactured supplies required by the government) be purchased through the India
Office. This protected the monopolies that both the government in India and the
industries of Britain had. At first this policy was carefully implemented, but several
economic factors, including silver depreciation, caused them to relax the policy starting
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in 1876.109 Because of several destructive famines, the Indian Famine Commission asked
the government to further relax the policy in 1880. The Secretary of State agreed with
them and began campaigning to encourage local purchase and foster local industry
development.110 By 1883, the government majorly revised the policy to support local
industries.111 But iron and steel were left out.
Ball, recognizing the need to not compete with England, and later the difficulty of
competing with Germany and Belgium, suggested that only a select few mills be
developed in strategic locations where it was expensive to import iron and steel. He was
suggesting policies for a protected economy. Because of the tariffs and other importation
restrictions, he did not have to worry about the potential competitiveness of the steel mill.
Instead of competing with England, it was intended to supplement the imports from
Britain. He was not concerned with its competition with England; he was concerned
about the creation of the steel mill to enhance England’s competition with other European
nations. Later, Indian entrepreneurs would recognize the fragility of the system and
created their mills specifically so that they could compete with England.
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An inland factory, located in Raniganj field, would be most useful because it
would not be near any ports, Ball argued. It could supply the needs of the railroad within
a certain radius, lowering the cost of building for the Raj. It would not be able to compete
with Madras or Bombay imports, and would therefore not be a threat to the British
economy.112 He further recognized that too many factories would cause the industrial
economy of India to collapse in on itself. Manufacturing too much iron, he hypothesized,
would lower the price of English iron. Indian manufacturers would need to drop their
prices as well, and they would constantly be undersold until they failed. Then once again
imported steel would take the market. It would be nothing but a costly mistake to create
an extensive manufacturing industry in India.113 A major motivation behind Ball’s
suggested railway route was that it would encourage a manufacturing plant in the central
regions of India, but one that would be safely out of competition with British iron.114
Part of the reason Ball wanted to open a mill was because it would provide a
location that would increase the value of not only the minerals in the immediate area of
the mill, but also the surrounding areas. Since mineral value was based on location,
building a mill would provide a new location which would make the minerals relevant.
Making the central provinces valuable could lead to the development of a center of trade
between Calcutta and Bombay.
The British geologists tried to find places that would work for manufacturing, but
they were largely unsuccessful. Like coal, the success and value of manufactured goods
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was heavily dependent on location, but with even more considerations. Not only did the
mill have to be close to a railway, but it needed to be close to the minerals that the factory
would use to manufacture goods. It had to be close to a coalfield which contained a good
amount of quality coal so that it would not damage the equipment and would work
efficiently. It needed to be close to a supply of water so that they could wash the coal.115
It would have to be close to a hematite deposit to get the basic materials in making ore.
Fluxes would also need to be located in close proximity. A geologist would not suggest
starting a mill unless all of these conditions existed or could be made. In 1852, Oldham
had been sent by the Court of Directors to the Damuda valley to determine whether a mill
could be built there. What he found was a successful group of Hindus and Muslims
working the iron. But based on western methods and requirement, “Dr. Oldham finally
concluded that the absence of economical fuel and the scanty supply of ore determined
the inapplicability of any extended series of operations for smelting and manufacturing
iron in the district of Birbhum.”116
After that, the British showed little interest in starting a mill themselves, other
than subsidizing some small scale production. India’s production fulfilled two of the
three uses for iron in India: tools, hardware, and weapons. Everything else could be
imported.117 The geologists had failed to get the government to start at least one
economically significant mill.
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Overall, the scientists advocated for policies with the potential to increase the
efficiency of resource extraction. Every piece of their proposed legislation was for the
purpose of enriching the empire by imposing a systematic order. Ordering the records and
collections of the GSI would reduce wasted time and money, and could be used to train
new geologists who did not have to be imported from Britain. Imposing a conservation
plan would ensure that an area would continue to be productive for years to come.
Situating the railroads near major mineral deposits would increase the value of both the
railroad and the minerals. The Raj agreed with the geologists on all of these proposed
changes, though they were reluctant to begin manufacturing metals. The British
continued to rely upon British, German, and Belgian steel and iron imports. They would
not realize how fragile this reliance was until WWI.
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CHAPTER III

INDIAN GEOLOGISTS: EDUCATION AND INDUSTRY
Even though the Geological Survey of India was a “premier scientific
institution,”118 in some cases it obstructed the development of the geological sciences in
India. As a group, the British members of the GSI generally opposed a national education
system that taught the earth sciences, whether on a theoretical level or an applied level.
Usually this was due to racism. Officers in the GSI, and especially one of the directors,
Henry B. Medlicott, believed Indians were incapable of doing any type of sophisticated
science. They wished to keep up the reputation and excellence of their institution, and to
geologists like Medlicott that meant excluding Indians. Although he was a geology
professor at the Thomason College of Civil Engineering at Roorkee (now the Indian
Institute of Technology, Roorkee), he spent most of his time surveying. He protested any
efforts to educate Indians to be anything other than assistant workers.119 On the other end
of the spectrum, Thomas Oldham opposed education on the grounds that no university in
India was capable of teaching geology well enough. The government made some
superficial attempts at improving education, but with little support from Britain and none
from local geologists, they did not get very far. By the 1870s, an education in science
from universities in India was next to useless.
Industry was not much better off, especially the steel industry. The policies had
stagnated at this point. The economy benefitted from importing and exporting material,
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but the British were unwilling to invest such a large amount of wealth into starting a steel
manufacturing mill to create steel for their own needs, like railroads. They did little to
encourage any mining or development except for coal and precious minerals beyond
allowing a few British to open some mills.120 The mills were unsuccessful and were shut
down. The Raj, though interested in having production in India, did not do much to
encourage it and sometimes their policies even hampered enterprising efforts. British
geologists encouraged the Raj to support mining and refining material, since foreign steel
imports from Germany and Belgium began to develop a monopoly in India. But they
were hired primarily to find coal, and so could not do much more than to include a report
about potential resources they found other than coal. Britain was behind most of the rest
of Europe and the United States in manufacturing techniques and equipment, so they did
not find it important to import something that would not be very profitable. The
government itself was difficult to work with as well. The viceroy and secretary of state
were not in office very long, so “the policies of the Indian government moved by fits and
starts, from dynamic action to near-paralysis and back . . . [sometimes] a stalemate arose
between the viceroy and the secretary of state. The iron industry in particular, which
normally needs years to develop, fell victim to these periodic stalemates.”121
With the government dragging its feet and the British geologists either opposed to
or ambivalent about policies regarding education and industry, the task of improving the
policies fell to Indians. Pramatha Nath Bose was the most influential Indian geologist of
his time. He joined the swadeshi movement to promote Indian self-sufficiency through
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education and technology. Several other Indian scientists also supported the swadeshi
movement; however, as a geologist, Bose was in the unique position to find valuable
resources that the British had either ignored or not discovered. He used his skills as a
geologist and his experience with his English education to improve educational policies
and change outdated and obstructive industrial policies. Bose approached education and
industrialization differently than Ball and Oldham. He wanted universities to teach earth
sciences, and instead of having the Raj build mills, he wanted manufacturing industries to
be owned by Indians.

Education

Geology was one of the sciences that promulgated racism and relied on a crude
Social Darwinism. When Europeans encountered what they thought were “geological
‘lost worlds’ [and] ‘landscapes of the past,’” they assumed that the primitiveness of the
landscape also applied to the native people as well.122 Reading the landscape as primitive
and then applying the primitiveness to its inhabitants influenced British policies.123 But it
went beyond just establishing backwardness as a national characteristic. Geology also
morally justified the existence of the British Raj using the same reasons. Racism, and the
resulting discrimination, were essential to British policy in India.124 Kumar argues that
this racialism “was a tool, not an end in itself. The end was to legitimize a complete
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psychic subordination.”125 The British government in India found geologists’
explanations useful when they defined and reinforced hierarchies based on race, and
through it, they were able to refine exploitation.126
Several of the geologists that worked for the GSI promoted ideas about the
inferiority of Indians. Medlicott, who succeeded W. T. Blanford as the President of the
Asiatic Society in 1879, and was the director of the GSI after Oldham retired, was
especially racist against Indians.127 He considered them mentally unwilling, if not
incapable, of understanding modern science and conducting research.128 To him and
others like him, admitting that an Indian was equally capable, or more so, of learning and
conducting Western science was “‘suicidal . . . [Europeans] should claim to be superior in
everything, and only allow a native to take a secondary or subordinate part.’”129 Other
geologists, like Thomas Oldham, were not as opposed to the idea that Indians would
make good scientists. He hired a few Indians to work for him as apprentices in ungraded
posts (meaning they were not specialists and received no extra pay for their professional
abilities) and required that they attend science classes. Indians were “treated only as
minor partners, in case partnership was at all required.”130 Unfortunately, Oldham was in
the minority. Most of the British colonial officials were ambivalent about whether
Indians should be hired to work as or alongside scientists. The majority of geologists
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were xenophobic, and it was their beliefs that and shaped government policy. Usually the
government would suggest that the Indian scientists settle for secondary positions.131
However, racism and discrimination against Indian scientists were not always
profitable to the British Raj. It was incredibly difficult to procure a qualified geologist
from Britain. British geologists in India believed there were few men that were qualified
enough to be hired. They preferred the gentleman geologists to “artisans,” or men who
worked directly with mining rather than focusing on the philosophical or theoretical
dimensions of science.132 During the 1840s, geologists in India attempted to convince
Lyell and Murchison to conduct research in India. Lyell seriously considered the offer,
but eventually turned it down because he felt that the government would not pay him well
enough for his expertise. He was also afraid for his health and family.133 Geologists from
Britain who worked in India usually died within a few years.134 The GSI also offered
poor incentives for anyone to come work for them because of limited funding.135 Thus,
there was little to tempt any British geologist to work in India, and getting a geologist
typically took more than nine months.136 This caused a shortage of qualified British earth
scientists in India. The British Raj attempted to solve this problem by hiring Indians to
work for the GSI.
Indians had already proven themselves essential to geological research. Each
geologist needed a staff of servants during their surveys. The all-Indian staff, usually
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assigned by an Indian clerk, included a doctor, head man, and several domestic servants
known as chuprasies.137 The Indian staff helped gather information from locals about the
geographic features of an area.138 European researchers relied heavily on native
information, especially in the early years of administration under the EIC. Native
informants were an important part of information-gathering networks because the
Europeans did not have the time nor the means to rediscover what Indians already knew,
but were able to follow up on a tip from Indians.139 The government declared the
knowledge of native informants as public property, especially metal working Indians.140
Indians were also important for gathering information when a European could not safely
(physically or politically) do so. If British geologists felt that their personal safety was
threatened, or when they needed information from “independent Indian states where the
active presence of a European geologist might be considered as impolitic,” they recruited
Indians to gather information.141 For example, Sarat Chandra Das was sent to survey the
landscape of Tibet, which would be useful to the military, essentially acting as a spy for
the Raj. The government of Tibet was understandably wary of what they perceived to be
the beginning of a British invasion, but Das was able to make a few friends who helped
gather the information he needed.142 Besides being useful in politically problematical
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situations, the British also found it beneficial to hire Indians for several other reasons. As
Kumar argued, “J. Mulheran, who headed the Topographical Party of Hyderabad Survey,
preferred natives as fieldworkers because ‘they require less assistance from the local
authorities, have greater influence with the people, are more rapidly replaced if they give
dissatisfactions, and as a body are more easily managed and directed.’”143
The Raj hoped to hire Indians educated as geologists to fill the shortage. But this
is where British geologists stood in the way of geology’s development in India, since
they considered few of these Indian workers qualified geologists. Because of the
prejudices among the geologists of the GSI, they often adamantly opposed Indians being
hired to work with them. This caused significant tension between men in the government
and men working for the GSI. The Secretary to the Government of India, A. O. Hume,
even went so far as to request that Medlicott and Oldham be fired so that Indians, who
cost less to employ, could be hired.144 Eventually, the government settled on promising
two posts to Indians within the GSI in 1886. Since there was no reliable geology
education in India at that time, they felt that two positions provided adequate
accommodation for the Indians.145
At first, the Raj considered instituting a good education system to teach geology
and other earth sciences. The motivation was not just economic. The military was also
pushing for more attention to be paid to education.146 The education system, however,
was more of an obstruction for Indians rather than a service. It required that everything be
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taught in English, which made understanding advanced science difficult, and it placed too
much emphasis on subjects like language and logic. The government tentatively
approached Calcutta University about changing the education system to accommodate
geology in the curriculum. But the university did not see a need to teach geology.147
Oldham had offered to teach students, but then withdrew his offer. He believed that the
university in Calcutta lacked the necessary facilities to teach geology adequately.148
Medlicott completely opposed geology being taught in India since he believed that
Indians were physically and mentally incapable of conducting research and coming up
with new or valuable science, and that they were completely uninterested in any type of
real science.149 The government was unconvinced that they needed to institute a geology
program since it would be expensive to hire a professor from Britain and there was no
guarantee that Indian students would have a career after graduating, given the attitudes of
the directors of the GSI.
The Raj instead considered hiring Indian students who had studied in England.
The Gilchrist scholarship, established in 1865, enabled a few Indian students to get an
education in England.150 P. N. Datta, one of the Gilchrist scholars, came back to India
highly recommended by Archibald Geikie. Despite a recommendation from one of the
most renowned geologists of the time, Medlicott was upset that he was required to work
with an Indian. The government responded by demoting Datta to assistant geologist, and
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he assisted Oldham with his research.151 Datta was also paid only two-thirds of what
others in his post earned. When the Secretary of State noticed the discrepancy, he also
discovered that the GSI had not eliminated a clause that made this practice legal. Other
departments had gotten rid of it around 1893. Eventually the “Governor-General finally
admitted that this clause ‘was inadvertently inserted in our office and escaped our
observation’.”152
Pramatha Nath Bose was another Gilchrist scholar who was much more
successful than Datta. He graduated from London University in 1877 and continued his
study at the Royal School of Mines.153 While in England, Bose enjoyed the scientific
communities and societies that were not present in India. He felt, for the first time, that he
belonged to an international scientific community. He faced relatively little
discrimination while in Britain.154 He felt comfortable enough to criticize the British
government. As a student he often campaigned for Indian rights. Although he would have
preferred to stay in England, his criticisms of the government prompted the British to get
rid of him. To get Bose back to India, the British government sent Bose to work for the
GSI in 1880. The Secretary to the Government of India was happy to comply with the
British government’s request, and Bose became the first Indian to receive a graded post
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working as a government geologist.155 It was also, Bose believed, the first time that the
“‘Secretary of State exercised his discretion in favour of an Indian in regard to the
appointment in his patronage.’”156 Upon returning to India, Bose was disappointed by the
lack of the freedom and sense of community he had enjoyed in Britain. “…the experience
of returning to India to encounter racial discrimination, European domination of the
services and grudging official recognition for his scientific qualifications was made even
more galling by having previously known, and participated in, a more open scientific
community.”157
Bose was also upset by the lack of pure scientific research in India. When he
returned to India, most sciences were driven by the state. The government determined
which science was important and which was not by their potential for revenue. Several
years later, Bose criticized all of Western science for isolating itself. Pratik Chakrabarti
explained that Bose felt, “the negative applications of science were possible because
Western scientists had successfully insulated their laboratories from political conscience.
Even the most liberal scientists were ultimately serving capitalism through their
laboratories…What was required was a new political conscience not enfeebled by
science.”158 Recently, natural scientists began to find it necessary to include chemistry in
the study of geology. Instead of merely classifying rocks and minerals by their looks,
they discovered that they could classify them based on their chemical makeup. While
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British academics were embracing this idea and chemistry was in its professional stage in
England, geologists in India had little use for chemistry except to determine the quality of
the coal.159 Bose was unhappy that there was next to no research about chemistry being
done in India, and that India was not really considered anything more than a “vast
storehouse.”160
Bose adamantly supported educating Indians in Western science. However, one
principle that set Bose apart from the government was his emphasis on not just adopting
Western science, but adapting it to India’s needs. As he grew older, Bose became more
opposed to the British rule and their version of science and capitalism. Radhakrishna
wrote, “He felt that this had only helped the promotion of militarism and forged fresh
fetters on the weaker peoples.”161 Bose eventually joined the swadeshi, or self-sufficiency
movement in India. In 1903 he wrote A Plea for a Patriotic Movement, showing that
despite India’s resources and the capabilities of her people, the British had a monopoly
on science, technology and industry. He believed that the West’s morals162 combined
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with its capitalism lead to Mammonism and militarism, and said that it was possibly the
“greatest curse of modern civilization.”163 The three biggest obstacles to India’s
successful industrialization were lack of capital, technical education, and protection. Bose
supported moral and mental education (Eastern, as he terms it) to natural science
education (Western), but admitted that India “must march with the Western progress or
perish.”164 Thus, Bose asked the Indians to devote their time to learning natural sciences
and invest their capital in the swadeshi movement. This would provide protection for the
development of Indian industry.165 But at the same time, he also “called for a return to
nature and rural simplicity.”166 Though Bose had a romanticized view of India, especially
an India untainted by British imperialism, he also heavily criticized practices he thought
kept India from progressing in its own way. He mainly blamed the caste system for
preventing scientific progress. He pointed out that although their ancestors had not made
much headway in natural science, neither had the ancestors of the Europeans.167 He
thought that the “stagnation of the Hindu intellect” was because “caste rigidities led to an
isolation of the intellectual class from social realities. This put a stop to their study of
material science: ‘Directly the caste system prevented in course of time, the spread of
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knowledge beyond a small privileged hereditary class and indirectly led to the neglect of
the physical sciences.’”168 Bose’s wish was not that the British would negotiate a
situation that would work for Britain and for India; he believed that Britain’s rule was
completely incompatible with India and was unacceptable in any form. According to
Chakrabarti, “P.N. Bose ultimately dreamt the extremist Romantic dream of a new
industrial culture within an alternative world order.”169
His attitude towards Western science helped shape his proposed policy changes in
education. Rather than simply transplanting British technology, science, and education,
each had to be fine-tuned to fit the needs of India. He gave the practical example of soapmaking:
The raw materials available for it here are not all the same as those used in
Europe. For its manufacture on a commercial scale we must utilize our raw
materials; it would never pay to import any of the principal ingredients from
abroad. Caustic soda, for instance, may be made from some such substance as
saji. And for this purpose, this substance has to be analysed, its impurities
ascertained, and the most economical methods of purification and the preparation
of the caustic lye from it discovered. All this cannot be done except by a specialist
in Chemistry. Similar remarks would apply mutatis mutandis to good many other
industries.170
Bose was one of the most vocal promoters of a more useful education system in
India. In an 1886 pamphlet entitled Technical and Scientific Education in Bengal, he
wrote to the Indian population. Bose called for major changes in university curriculum,
especially at Calcutta University. He pointed out that some industries, such as mining,
soap-making, tanning, electro-engineering, and sugar-refining, are heavily dependent on
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science, but that the current education setup did not prepare a student in the sciences well
enough to learn the industries. The focus was literary rather than scientific or practical.
The universities lacked the resources to teach since the emphasis was on theoretical
knowledge. He called for Calcutta University to follow the structure of London
University. The first step, he said, was to “introduce better methods of Science teaching
in our colleges.”171 To do this, he said that less emphasis needed to be placed on learning
English; science students should only be required to know enough practical English to
understand science without learning additional prose. Students should be required to
write fewer papers focusing on the literary aspects. If students chose to be scientists, then
they should not have to write papers in history and logic. He believed that the university
was doing a disservice to the students by requiring that they study a lot of information
that would be of little use to them in their future careers. One of the most important steps
would be to require that “a practical examination should be held in every subject that
admits of it.”172 Since he thought that universities would be reluctant to introduce these
tests, he suggested that a Technical and Scientific Education Institute or the company
with which a student apprenticed with could administer the tests. He also suggested that
students serve as an apprentice to help ensure that they would be hired. The government
should provide scholarships to students who were unable to afford school or time off to
research, since many of them were too poor to stop working long enough to get an
education.173
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His pamphlet was influential, and by the time he wrote Scientific and Technical
Education in Bengal in 1906, the Calcutta University had instituted many of his proposed
reforms, though they kept the requirement that students write more papers on English.
Bose was pleased, but he still pushed for the university to be more attentive to following
the program.174 He also criticized other Indians outside of Bengal for not pursuing an
adequate scientific education seriously enough. He believed that they needed to much
more eagerly push for the universities to organize science programs similar to the one at
Calcutta University and London University.
Apart from providing education models to universities, Bose also helped create
societies to foster industrial development. Like several other Indians, he wanted to
increase scientific awareness and knowledge and technical ability among the Indians.
Bose was instrumental in establishing the Bengal Technical Institute (1906), a school
focused on teaching primarily technical knowledge. He was made honorary principal of
the school but had to leave it after two years to follow his work.175 The Institute was later
turned into the College of Engineering and Technology Jadavpur, and then became
Jadavpur University. While there, he emphasized the need for technical skills to be used
to gain capitalism. For him, it was a matter of patriotism. The less dependent India’s
industries were on the British, the better.176 Besides the Bengal Technical Institute, he
formed, or helped form, several other groups: the Indian Industrial Association, the
Industrial Conference (1891), and the Society for Development of Indian Industries.177
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The Industrial Conference and the Bengal Technical Institute were two successes, while
the other two quickly folded or became irrelevant. Still, Bose was trying to replace the
hierarchy of scientific knowledge in India. Bose was trying to shift the power that came
with scientific and technical knowledge to the Indians.

Industrialization

When Bose was first assigned to the GSI, Medlicott, as usual, was unhappy.
However, Medlicott began to like Bose, although he was quick to criticize anything he
found wrong with Bose’s work. Medlicott tested Bose:
I gave him to begin with an easy work at Nimar in which the leading features
were already marked. There were, no doubt, numerous tell-tale blunders in the
progress reports of his work, but his final descriptive account of the ground was
so well set up that, with needful correction, I passed it for publication. There was
indeed a suspiciously unnatural symmetry in his conclusions, but there was no
disputing them without a re-examination of the ground which was impossible.
The whole performance was undoubtedly clever, so I gave him the benefit of the
doubt. As an encouragement I even recommended him before the usual period for
promotion to the 2nd grade. When he was afterwards moved to ground in which
he had no outline to start with and the formations were new, his scientific
helplessness became at once apparent.178
Oldham, though he presumably liked Bose as well, also felt the need to correct his
work.179 Typically, when a geologist corrected another’s work, he either would provide
some explanation, sometimes bordering on an apology, for criticizing a colleague’s work
or refuse to name whose work he was correcting, which often happened when the
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previous geologist was not a member of the GSI and had little time to make an adequate
map.180 Apparently, correcting an Indian’s work required no such explanation.
Bose continued to face discrimination after he had worked for the GSI for twenty- three
years.181 Seniority was considered “sacrosanct” when considering which geologist to
promote to Director of the GSI. This is shown in the case of Thomas Blanford, who,
despite a recommendation for his promotion from Geikie, was superseded by someone
else on grounds of seniority.182 However, when it came time for Bose to be promoted to
Director, the Raj refused to put an Indian in charge of the Survey. They felt that it would
challenge their superiority and would damage the GSI’s reputation as a premier scientific
institution.183 In protest, Bose resigned from the GSI to continue pursuing the economic
benefits of geology.
While he was a member of the GSI, he discovered a deposit of hematite in the
Raipur district in 1887. Because of the emphasis the British Raj placed on coal and
precious minerals, he was unable to stay and evaluate how much he had found. Holland,
who later superseded Bose as Director of the GSI, decided to check on the discovery. He
found about 2.5 million tons of hematite with about 67.5 percent iron content, much
higher than ores in Britain, Sweden, Germany, and the United States. It was so pure that
“Dorjabji Tata, Weld, and Saklatvala184 [reported that the hills] rang under their
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boots.”185 Unfortunately, the hematite deposit was not close to any coal deposit, so the
project was essentially abandoned.
Once Bose left the survey he found a job working for the Maharajah of
Mayurbhanj in 1903. He went back to another area in Mayurbhanj, about 500 km east of
the Raipur district and much closer the coal deposits in Bengal, where he had also
discovered hematite to investigate its potential usefulness. He properly surveyed
Gurumaishini Hill and discovered the richest hematite deposit in the world. Because the
hematite was in a hill rather than buried deep underground, it was easier to mine. It was
also easier to smelt since it was very low in sulfur and phosphorus.186 Location, more
than accessibility and quality, was more important for steel manufacturing. For a hematite
deposit to be practical to mine and refine, there needed to be a “combination of iron ore,
coking coal, flux, and water close enough to each other and to major markets to keep
transport costs within reason.”187 Gurumaishini Hill had this combination. Instead of
contacting the British, Bose immediately wrote to the Tatas, an Indian family that was
looking to start a manufacturing company.
The family had already started a highly successful cotton manufacturing business
in the 1860s. They decided that they wanted to begin a steel manufacturing company
utilizing India’s rich natural resources. The British had already tried to start steel
companies in India. The first one was intended solely for military purposes. It was only
designed to make weapons and thus had little to no commercial significance. The second
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factory was underutilized, and after a few months of manufacturing pig iron with
substandard equipment, the repairs were so costly that the company abandoned its
attempts to make steel.188 There was plenty of demand for steel since the British were
trying to build the railways with steel rather than iron. This meant that India relied
heavily on imports from other European countries, such as Belgium and Germany, that
manufactured better steel more efficiently.
Though the demand for a local steel manufacturing company was high, there were
not very many people that could fill it. Starting a steel factory was expensive: “A steel
mill requires costly and complex equipment, and it cannot grow from small beginnings
but must be built big from the start.”189 The Tata family was one of just a few who were
wealthy enough to start a mill. Since they had been planning on opening a mill for a
while, they had hired geologists to scout out resources and had traveled throughout
Europe and the United States to determine where to buy their equipment. The United
States and Germany had the most advanced equipment that could turn out quality steel
quickly. Britain, as the Tatas discovered, was seriously lagging behind its competitors.
British equipment lasted longer, but manufacturing was more expensive which
increased the cost of British steel. Their expertise lay more in exporting and trading
resources rather than manufacturing metal. By 1904, their steel project was underway and
they had contracted with an American to build a steel mill for them.190
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Naturally the Tatas were Bose’s first choice. They had the required wealth, but
they also held the same ideals he did. They supported the idea of India being selfsufficient and resented their dependence on the British. Though they were already
looking to start a mill, it took Bose quite a bit to convince them. Since a mill required so
much investment up front, choosing the correct location with easy access to good quality
minerals was imperative. They had considered other places rich in good hematite but
decided not to go forward because of poor location. Bose had to convince them that
Gurumaishini Hill was as perfect a situation as they could hope for. Eventually they
agreed to start a mill in Sakchi (Jamshedpur). When the Tatas first requested permission
to mine, they were denied. The policies before the turn of the century regarding
individual prospecting were discouraging:
By the end of the century, individuals – but not companies – could obtain
prospecting licenses. Licenses were limited to a 10-square-kilometer area, and a
distance of 12.8 kilometers had to separate any two prospecting areas licensed to
the same individual. Then, once an area was explored, the government could
auction off the mining rights to it. Based on a misguided concept of fairness, the
regulations effectively discouraged even the most sanguine prospector.191
So the Tatas and Bose and the Raj were stuck in a difficult place. They were able and
ready to begin mining and manufacturing steel that the British badly needed, but an
injudicious policy kept them from it. They turned to the government in Britain to ask for
help. George Curzon, Major Mahon, and George Hamilton were ready to help. Major
Mahon sent coal samples to England to be analyzed for their usability. When he found
out that scientists had botched the analysis by testing a second-rate, unrepresentative
batch of coal that had lain out in a stock yard for months, he sent coal better representing
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the resources in India. The results were much more encouraging, and this prompted him
to publish the Report upon the Manufacture of Iron and Steel in India in which he
requested that large-scale steel manufacturing be undertaken, suggesting that Indian
workers be trained to be the manufacturers.192 The Secretary to the Government of India,
Public Works Department, sent a copy to the Committee of the Bengal Chamber of
Commerce to ask for their advice. They replied that it was a viable idea and that the
government should follow through, but neglected to state any specific concessions to
make it happen.193 George Hamilton encouraged Tata in his efforts and essentially told
the government in India not to stand in Tata’s way.194 George Curzon, the new viceroy,
had high hopes for India. Although he had little faith in Indians and wanted the power to
remain in British hands, he cleared the way for the Tatas to begin mining.195 Geologists
from the GSI also advocated for this industry. Holland wrote to Curzon asking him to
encourage the Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO) because he feared that if no one
developed a steel manufacturing plant, then the economy would be subject to imports of
German steel.196
So the British, both in Britain and in India, supported Indians’ efforts to start
manufacturing. But they did little more than change the policies to assist them. When the
Tatas tried to get the government to promise to buy steel from them, they declined. No
funding was forthcoming either. So the Tatas turned to the Indians for funding who were
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more than happy to buy shares. Including the Tata family holdings, Parsis held 36 percent
of the shares, and Hindus, Jains, and Sikhs came in at 50 percent of shares. The British
only bought around 5 percent.197 Only after the future of TISCO and the quality of its
steel looked solid was the government willing to contract with the company to buy steel
from them.198
Though the British did not know it at the time, helping to clear the way for and
supporting TISCO was one of the best decisions they made during the early twentieth
century. During World War I, Britain was cut off from its primary steel supplier:
Germany. Since the British steel industry was lagging behind most of the rest of Europe
and the United States, they depended heavily on TISCO to provide them with quality
steel quickly at a good price. The high demand for steel from India was also a “godsend.”
According to Headrick, “The Indian government now purchased all of TISCO’s
output…For several years TISCO grew up in a totally protected seller’s market. Though
the government paid less than the market price, the lost profits turned out to be a wise
investment in government goodwill for the future. No infant industry could have asked
for a happier childhood.”199 We begin to see that Bose’s recipe for successful Indian
manufacturing was correct. Tata Steel was not held back by the three obstacles that
prevented most Indian industries from success. They had the capital (first from the Tatas
and then from the Indians), the technical education (that Bose, among several others, had
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been working to provide in India),200 and the protection (provided by the British, but
especially by the demand created by the war). By persuading Jamshedji Tata to start his
steel and iron industry, Bose “initiated a gigantic step towards Indian
industrialization.”201
For Bose, an excellent scientific and technical education would help lead India
into being a successful, modern (Western), competitive industrialized nation. He did not
consider this to be progress though. He would have preferred, especially from the time he
left the GSI, that India return to the way it was before it was infected with British
imperialism and Western science and its associated moral degeneration. However, he
recognized that to survive, India would need to compete with the West on its own terms.
This required extensive repairs to the education system set up by the British and a
network of Indian-run societies dedicated to improving and monitoring technical and
scientific education. It also required that the education be applied. India would not only
have to be able to be self-sustaining, but to be competitive in at least a few industries.
This was more than a bid for a share in the capital of the world; education and
industrial development were a national duty. He thought that industrializing would help
the environment, better the employment prospects for the middle class, and help stop the
economic drain from India.202 The industries would need to be owned by Indians. But
there was a much more important reason. Bose approached policy issues with urgency
because changing education, industrialization, and trade policies were not just convenient
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or important to getting wealth. Bose believed that the development of self-sufficient
industries would prevent exploitation. India’s future depended on these policy changes.
His end goal was to kill militant imperialism, if not all of Western imperialism in India,
with scientific and technological equality. Bose explained:
The aggressive imperialism of modern Europe is based upon industrialism. It is
chiefly in the interest of their industries, that the greater powers of the West are
anxious to dominate the peoples of the East. If these peoples made a vigorous
well-concerted effort to develop their resources on western methods, and supply
their own wants, their markets would cease to be exploited in the way they now
are by western manufactures, and their lands would cease to be the happy hunting
ground of western enterprise. Western imperialism, would thus die a natural and
peaceful death, at least in its present highly objectionable militant form. That is a
revolutions so wholesome and far-reaching in the interests both of the East and of
the West – that it is well worth a mighty effort on the part of all orientals.203
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
Scientists were influential agents of change. Because of geology’s nature,
geologists held more sway over the government than other scientific disciplines did. The
Raj considered them indispensable thanks to their economic usefulness. When budget
cuts affected other areas of science, such as zoology, the GSI was protected. Their
discoveries, but more importantly, their proposed use of their discoveries helped the
government make important decisions. Ball’s railway was the most obvious example of
this, but many other important changes and decisions were at least influenced, if not
directed, by a geologist. By the time they retired, Oldham, Ball, and Bose had
accomplished much of what they wanted. Oldham and Ball, besides their success in
policy-changing, also received the recognition they wanted. Both retired in Britain. Ball
was made a fellow of the Geological Society of London, the Royal Society of London,
and president of the Royal Geological Society of Ireland. He also held appointments as a
professor at the University of Dublin and director of an Irish museum.204 Oldham
received the prestigious Royal Medal from the Royal Society in 1875, among other
appointments as fellow, professor, and museum director.205 Bose retired to Ranchi, which
is west of Kolkata, where he built a large house and spent most of his time gardening. He
was awarded several honors from Indian scientists and societies.206 These geologists had,
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from both inside and outside of the GSI, shaped how geology was used and taught in
India.
Geology was not the only agent that drove policy change. There were several
other considerations in each case (except perhaps in the case of the museum) such as
military concerns, famine, other scientists’ reports, budget, Britain’s economy, etc. But it
was an important agent. Geologists provided not only information, but proposals for what
the Raj should do.
The GSI functioned as the British expected it to. Geologists brought in the results
that the British wanted. In this way, the top heavy model of government is correct. The
government’s control dictated what the geologists could spend their time doing and
which minerals were worth investigating and which were not. However, the model
neglects to address the way British geologists used the Raj’s dependency on their surveys
to get what they wanted. Because geologists’ importance was tied to the mineral that
fueled the nation, geologists were very effective in changing policies that they felt
restricted them. But they were not trying to change the entire system of government.
Their scope was much smaller than Bose’s. They were looking to change policies that
would help the GSI directly. Museums, conservation, and extraction were all things that
they successfully proved to the government to change in their favor. The government was
willing because the GSI’s primary purpose (and, for some time, their only one) was to
bring wealth to the empire. They were willing to fund the proposals only so far as the
geologists proved that a great return would be derived from a small investment. Though
Ball and other British geologists were unsuccessful in trying to get the Raj to build mills,
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they were able to help get the policies relaxed against private companies. They had
helped prime the policies for when Tata and Bose asked the government for permission to
start the mill. Unless the government saw an immediate and assured profit in a project,
they were reluctant to undertake it. At least the Raj considered manufacture, as shown by
when they sent Oldham to investigate a potential area. Part of their reluctance was
because Ball was not just suggesting that they build mills; he was suggesting that the
government start changing its entire economic set up. Instead of being an economy based
on export of raw materials, they would start to become an independent and self-sustaining
colony.
In other ways, even though it was a ‘premier scientific institution,’ the GSI was
too restrictive. They had already showed their unwillingness to start a large scale mill,
and they were reluctant to spend a lot of time fixing the education system. Bose had to
leave before he could accomplish anything significant. Once outside of the GSI, he could
use his discoveries as he saw fit. He went back to all of the discoveries that had been
deemed unimportant, and, by convincing Indians of their worth, was able to bring the Raj
a proposal that they found acceptable. Since the government did not see the immediate
need of changing the education system, Bose had to convince Indians that their future as
a nation depended on their ability to keep up with Europe. His power lay in convincing
his people that they needed to change the system. They would come up with a proposal
and present it to the government, who often found it acceptable and useful. Together, the
Indian investors and scientists shaped the India’s economic framework.
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The GSI functioned as both a source of power for British geologists and an
institution that stopped geology’s development. The British scientists were able to change
several policies that brought them, and the empire, more power. But Bose, despite his
education and abilities, could not escape the racism within the GSI. After he left, he was
able to restructure how geology was taught and what it could be used for. It took
scientists, working from both from inside and outside the GSI, to shape the policies in
colonial India.
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MAP 1
UK government India Office. A Map of India. 1871. April 5, 2009. Wikimedia
Commons.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IndiaRailwaysCompletedBy1871.jpg.
This is the map of railways in India completed by 1871. The only way to get to Bombay
from Calcutta was to take the train north to Allahabad and then drop down into Calcutta.

81

MAP 2
General Map of Railways. 1909. September 18, 2007. Wikimedia Commons.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:India_railways1909a.jpg.
The railways system by 1909. Ball’s railway cuts through the Central Provinces from
Bombay to Calcutta.

